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Abstract
This paper explores the eﬀect of consumption externalities on equilibrium
dynamics of a standard neoclassical growth model in which there are two types
of agents. To emphasize the presence of heterogenous agents, we distinguish
intergroup consumption externalities from intragroup consumption external-
ities. We show that if there are intragroup consumption externalities alone,
then the steady state equilibrium satisﬁes saddle-point stability and the equi-
librium path of the economy is uniquely determined. In contrast, even if the
intragroup consumption externalities do not exist, the intergroup external ef-
fects of consumption may yield either unstability or local indeterminacy of the
steady-state equilibrium. In addition to analytical considerations, we show the
relationship between the stability and the consumption externalities in numer-
ical examples.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there is a renewed interest in consumption external eﬀects in dynamic
macroeconomic analyses. While the earlier contributions such as Abel (1990) and
Gali (1991) focus on the role of consumption externalities in the asset-pricing models,
the recent studies treat a wider class of issues. For example, the recent investigations
consider external eﬀects of consumption on optimal taxation (Linquvist and Sargent
1997), on the relation between savings and long-term economic growth (Carroll et al.
1997 and 2000) as well as on interactions of consumption and production externali-
ties (Weder 2000 and Liu and Turnovsky 2005). A common feature of this literature
is that most studies employ the representative agent frameworks. In this literature
the consumption external eﬀect is formulated in such a way that an individual con-
sumer’s felicity depends on the average level of consumption in the economy as well
as on her own consumption. In the equilibrium of representative-agent economies
the individual and the average levels of consumption coincide each other and, there-
fore, the presence of consumption externalities generally produce quantitative eﬀect
rather than qualitative eﬀect: the equilibrium dynamics and the steady state char-
acterization are usually the same as the models without consumption externalities.
Unlike the mainstream literature mentioned above, this paper examines the role of
consumption externalities in the presence of heterogenous agents. Since the external
interactions among the consumers tend to be much more complex in an economy
with heterogenous agents than in the representative-agent counterpart, the presence
of consumption external eﬀects would yield fundamental impacts on the dynamic
behavior of the economy if we consider heterogeneity of consumers. Using a simple
model of the neoclassical growth model with two types of agents, we conﬁrm our
prediction. We show that even in the symmetric steady state where every agent has
the same levels of income and wealth, the dynamic behavior of the economy may
not exhibit a regular saddle point stability. The equilibrium path of the economymay be either unstable or indeterminate. Thus consumption externalities, together
with heterogeneity of agents, would yield a variety of dynamic behaviors even in the
absence of production externalities or complex preference structure associated with
variable labor supply.
The analytical framework of this paper is the standard neoclassical growth model
with inﬁnitely-lived agents. In this setting it has been well known that there exists
a continuum of steady states if all the agents have an identical time discount rate,
while the agent with the lowest time discount rate ultimately owns the entire capital
stock if the time discount rate of each agent is not identical. To avoid those extreme
outcomes, we introduce progressive income taxation into the base model. As pointed
out by Sarte (1997), the presence of progressive income tax scheme may yield a unique
interior steady state in which every agent holds a positive amount of capital, even
though the agents have heterogenous rates of time preferences. Owing to progressive
income taxation, the steady state equilibrium of our economy with heterogenous
agents is essentially the same as the stationary equilibrium of the representative
agent economy. Hence, we may elucidate how the introduction of heterogeneity of
agents aﬀect the role of consumption externalities in the transition process of an
economy.
Our investigation presents two ﬁndings. First, either if there are only intragroup
consumption externalities or if the magnitude of intergroup consumption external-
ities is small enough, then a uniquely given steady state exhibits a regular saddle
point property. In this case, the equilibrium path is determinate and it converges
to the steady state equilibrium. Our second ﬁnding is that if the intergroup ex-
ternal eﬀects have large impacts on the individual consumption decision, then the
steady state equilibrium is either totally unstable or locally indeterminate. In the
latter case, there exists a continuum of converging paths around the steady state, so
that expectations-driven economic ﬂuctuations may emerge. If this is the case, the
presence of heterogenous agents plays a pivotal role for characterizing the standard
neoclassical growth model with consumption externalities.
It is to be noted that Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) and Chen and Hasu (2007)
3reveal that equilibrium indeterminacy may hold in the representative agent models
with consumption externalities. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) show that if labor-
leisure choice is allowed and if the utility function is not homothetic with respect to
private and average consumption levels, then the one-sector growth model with con-
sumption externalities may generate indeterminacy of equilibrium.1 Chen and Hasu
(2007) examines a two-sector growth model and shows that the presence of consump-
tion externalities aﬀects resource allocation between two production sectors, which
may cause multiple equilibria. Indeterminacy shown in these studies is, therefore,
partially depends on the complex preference structure or on the production side of
the model economy. In contrast, our study uses a one-sector neoclassical growth
model with ﬁxed labor supply, so that the presence of heterogenous agents is the
main source of multiple equilibria.
The next section sets up the analytical framework. Section 3 examines the dy-
namic behavior of our model economy and presents intuitive implication of the sta-
bility conditions. Section 4 presents numerical examples. Concluding remarks are
given in Section 5.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two groups of inﬁnitely-lived agents. Each group consists
of a continuum of identical households. The preference and the initial holding of
wealth of the representative household in each group are diﬀerent from each other.
For simplicity, we assume that population in the economy is constant over time, so
that the mass of each group will not change. We also assume that the economy is
closed and the government does not issue interest bearing bonds. Thus the stock of
capital is the only net asset held by agents.
1More precisely, the presence of indeterminacy requires that the marginal substitution between
private and average consumption is not constant along the equilibrium path where the average
consumption of the economy at large coincides with the level of private consumption.
42.1 Households
The representative agent in group i (i = 1,2) supplies one unit of labor in each
moment and maximizes a discounted sum of utilities over an inﬁnite time horizon.






i(ci,Ci,Cj)dt, ρi > 0, i,j = 1,2, i ̸= j. (1)
In the above, ρi denotes a given rate of time discount of group i agent, ci her private
consumption, and Ci and Cj respectively represent the average levels of consump-
tion in groups i and j. The instantaneous utility function, ui(·), is assumed to be
monotonically increasing and strictly concave in private consumption, ci. It is also
assumed that in the symmetric equilibrium where ci = C1 = C2, the utility function
holds the Inada conditions: limC→0 ui
1(C,C,C) = ∞ and limC→∞ ui
1(C,C,C) = 0,
where ui
m (·) (m = 1,2, 3) denotes the partial derivative of the utility function with
respective to the m-th variable in ui (·).
The key assumption about the instantaneous felicity function in (1) is that we
distinguish intragroup externalities from intergroup externalities. Namely, an agent’s
concern with the consumption levels of members in her own group may be diﬀerent
from the concern with consumption of agents in the other group. The presence of in-
tergroup external eﬀects produces the outcomes speciﬁc to models with heterogenous
agents.
Following the taxonomy given by Dupor and Liu (2003), the external eﬀect of
consumption on an individual consumption may be either negative (jealousy) of
positive (admiration). In addition, each consumer would be a conformist who likes
being similar to others (keeping up with the Joneses) or a anti-conformist who wants
to be diﬀerent from others (running away from the Joneses). We allow, for example,
an agent in a particular group feels jealousy as to consumption of others in her group
but admires consumption of agents belongs to the other group. Such a situation may
emerge, the agents in the rich group admire an increase in the benchmark level of
consumption in the poor group, whereas they have jealousy as to the consumption
level of other members in her group. In addition, the agent is a conformist as to
5consumption behavior of her group’s members, but keeps away from consumption
behavior of the other group’s agents. As a result, even though there are only two
types of agents, the external eﬀects among the consumers cover a richer class of
situations than that treated in the representative-agent economy.
As usual, the negative externality (jealousy) is expressed by ui
j (·)(= ∂ui/∂Cj) <
0 (i = 1,2, j = 2,3), while positive externality (admiration) means that ui
j (·) has a
positive value. Similarly, the consumers’ conformism is shown by ui
1j (·)(= ∂2ui/∂Cj∂ci) >
0, and anti-conformist holds if ui
1j (·)(= ∂2ui/∂Cj∂ci) < 0. In what follows, we as-
sume that, regardless of the forms of external eﬀects, the eﬀects of a change in the
private consumption dominate the impact on her utility caused by external eﬀect.




















1j(·) < 0, i = 1,2. (2c)
Conditions (2a) mean that the marginal utility of own consumption dominates im-
pacts produced by consumption externalities. Conditions (2b) show that the marginal
utility of own consumption diminishes even considering external eﬀects. Conditions
(2c) ensure that, in a social symmetric equilibrium C1 = C2, the marginal utility of
consumption in a group is positive and it decreases with private consumption.
The ﬂow budget constraint for each agent is
˙ ki = ˆ riki + ˆ wi − ci + Ti, i = 1,2, (3)
where, ki is capital stock owned by an agent in group i, ci consumption, ˆ ri after-tax
rate of return to asset, ˆ wi the after-tax real wage rate and Ti expresses a transfer
from the government. The initial holding of capital, ki (0), is exogenously given.
2.2 Production
The representative ﬁrm produces a single good according to a constant-returns-to-
scale technology expressed by ¯ Y = F
( ¯ K,N
)
where ¯ Y , ¯ K and N denote the total
6output, capital and labor, respectively. Using the homogeneity assumption, we write
the production function Y = f (K) where Y ≡ ¯ Y /N and K ≡ ¯ K/N. The productiv-
ity function, f (K), is assumed to be monotonically increasing and strictly concave
in the capital-labor ratio, K, and fulﬁlls the Inada conditions. The commodity mar-
ket is competitive so that the before-tax rate of return to capital and real wage are
respectively determined by
r = f
′(K), w = f(K) − Kf
′(K). (4)
For simplicity, we assume that capital does not depreciate.
If we denote the number of agents in group i by Ni (i = 1,2), then the full-
employment condition for labor and capital are N1+N2 = N and N1k1+N2k2 = ¯ K.
Letting θi = Ni/N, we can the full-employment conditions as follows:
K = θ1k1 + θ2k2, , 0 < θi < 1, θ1 + θ2 = 1. (5)
For notational simplicity, in the following we normalize the total population, N, to
one. Thus θi represents the mass of agents of type i as well as the population share
of that type.
2.3 Fiscal Rules
The government levies distortionary income tax and distributes back its tax revenue
as a transfer to each agent. In the main part of the paper, we assume that the same
rate of tax applies to both capital and labor incomes. The rate of tax applies to
income of an agent in group i is τi = τ (yi), (i = 1,2) where τi is the rate of tax and
yi (= rki + wi) denotes the total income of an agent in group i. The tax function τ(yi):
ℜ+ → ℜ+ is continuous, monotonically increasing, a twice diﬀerentiable function and
satisﬁes 0 < τ(yi) < 1.
The after-tax rate of return and real wage received by type i agents are respec-
tively written as
ˆ ri = (1 − τ (yi))r, ˆ wi = (1 − τ (yi))w, i = 1,2. (6)
7As a result, the ﬂow budget constraint for the household (3) is rewritten as
˙ ki = (1 − τ (yi))yi − ci + Ti, i = 1,2.
We assume that the government follows the balanced-budget rule and, therefore, its
ﬂow budget constraint (in per-capita term) is
θ1T1 + θ2T2 = θ1τ (y1)y1 + θ2τ (y2)y2.
In addition, if we assume that the government pays back an identical amount of
transfer to each agent, the lump-sum transfers of the group 1 and the group 2 are
given by
T1 = T2 = θ1τ (y1)y1 + θ2τ (y2)y2. (9)
2.4 Consumption and Capital Formation
Under the ﬁscal rules given above, the type i agent’s ﬂow budget constraint is ex-
pressed as
˙ ki = (1 − τ (yi))(rki + w) − ci + Ti, i = 1,2, (10)
where Ti is determined by (9). Following Guo and Lansing (1998), we assume that
the households perceive the rule of progressive taxation on private income, but she
takes the transfer payment, Ti, as given. Therefore, the household of type i maximizes
(1) subject to (10), the initial holding of capital, ki (0) as well as to the anticipated,
given of {Ci(t),Cj(t),r(t),w(t),Y (t),Ti (t)}
∞
t=0 .

















, i,j = 1,2. (12)
Here, Ωi
s denotes the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption within the agent’s
own group, which equals the inverse of an elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
private consumption plus social consumption in its own group. This elasticity has
a positive value due to condition (2b). Additionally, Ωi
o is the elasticity of marginal
8utility with respect to the other group’s consumption. The sign of this term depends
on how group i agents respond to consumption of group j agents. If agents are
conformist to keep up with consumption of the other group’s members (so that ui
13
> 0), then Ωi
o has a negative sign. On the other hand, if they do not like being
similar to the other group’s agents (ui
13 < 0), then Ωi
o is strictly positive. Note that,





o > 0, i = 1,2. (13)

















(1 − τ(y1) − y1τ′(y1))r − ρ1
(1 − τ(y2) − y2τ′(y2))r − ρ2

.























(1 − τ(y1) − y1τ′(y1))r − ρ1
(1 − τ(y2) − y2τ′(y2))r − ρ2

. (14)
Equations (9) and (10) yield
˙ ki = (1 − τ (yi))yi − Ci + θ1τ (y1)y1 + θ2τ (y2)y2, i = 1,2. (15)
Summing up the ﬂow budget constraint (10) over all of the households and dividing
the both sides by N, we obtain
θ1˙ k1 + θ2˙ k2 = θ1y1 + θ2y2 − θ1C1 − θ2C2.
Thus, in view of yi = rki + w and (5), we obtain the ﬁnal-good market equilibrium
condition for the entire economy: ˙ K = f (K) − C where C = θ1C1 + θ2C2.
3 Macroeconomic Stability
3.1 Dynamic System
Equations (4) and (5) give
yi = rki + w = f(K) + (ki − K)f
′(K), i = 1,2, (16)
9where K = θ1k1+(1 − θ1)k2. Plugging (16) into (14) and (15), we obtain a complete
dynamic system that depicts the dynamic behaviors of k1,k2,C1 and C2.
The solution of this dynamic system that fulﬁlls the initial conditions on k1 (0)
and k2 (0) as well as the transversality conditions for the households’ optimization
problem, limt→∞ ui
1 (Ci (t),Ci (t),Cj (t))e−ρtki (t) = 0, where i = 1, or 2 presents
the perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium of our model economy.
3.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
In the steady-state equilibrium, ki and Ci (i = 1,2) stay constant over time. In view





















, i,j = 1,2, i ̸= j, (17)
ρi = f
′(K







i)), i = 1,2, (18)
where C∗
i and k∗
i denote steady-state levels of ki and Ci.
To simplify analytical argument, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. τ (yi)+yiτ′ (yi) (i = 1,2) is a monotonic increasing function of the
income yi.
Given Assumption 1, it is easy to conﬁrm the following fact:
Proposition 1. Given Assumption 1, there is a unique steady state equilibrium. If





2 is uniquely determined. In addition, if ρ1 < (>)ρ2, then k∗
1 > (<)k∗
2
for i = 1 and 2.
Proof. See Appendix A. ■
The symmetry of steady state comes from the rates of time preference in both
groups. In other words, if the rates of time preference are the same, there is the
symmetric steady-state equilibrium. If these rates are not the same, there exists the
unique steady state that the level of capital stock in patient group is greater than
the other. Obviously, the transition dynamics out of the steady state of both groups
10are not necessarily symmetric because the initial holdings of capital stock as well as
the utility functions in both groups are not necessarily the same.
3.3 Stability
Let us examine the local stability condition of the steady-state equilibrium deﬁned
above. Linear approximation of dynamic system, (14) and (15), around the steady





















0 0 ∂ ˙ C1/∂k1 ∂ ˙ C1/∂k2
0 0 ∂ ˙ C2/∂k1 ∂ ˙ C2/∂k2
−1 0 ∂˙ k1/∂k1 ∂˙ k1/∂k2





































































































































The precise expression of matrix’s coeﬃcients and the term ZJ in (22) is displayed
in Appendix B of the paper.
Note that this model involves two jumpable variables, C1 and C2. Thus the neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions for local determinacy is that the characteristic equation
11(19) has two roots with negative real parts. Considering the form of (23), we see





o) under the assumption 1.
As for the stability of the steady state equilibrium our main ﬁnding is as follows:




o < 0, then the unique steady-
state equilibrium is either locally unstable or indeterminate.





o < 0. In this case the number of characteristic roots with negative
sign is either one or three. The former case means that the stable manifold is
one dimensional around the steady state and thus there no converging path can
be selected for arbitrarily given levels of initial capital stocks, k1 (0) and k2 (0). If
the number of stable roots is three, then there may exist a continuum of converging
path starting from the given initial distribution of capital stocks.■
First, this is not the case if Ω1
o and Ω2





o > 0. Concerning the diﬀerent signs of Ω1
o and Ω2
o, we may make the
intuitive explanation as follows. Assume that agents in group 1 live in the urban
area, while agents in group 2 live in the rural area. Then, it could be plausible to
assume that agents in group 2 like being similar to the average consumption in people
living in cities, whereas agents in group 1 have anti-conformism as to the average
consumption in the rural area. If this is the case, it holds that Ω1
o > 0 and Ω2
o < 0.
In addition, as proposition 1 shows, if ρ2 > ρ1, then group 1 agents are richer than
group 2 agents at least in the steady state. Therefore, if we restrict our discussion
to the steady state equilibrium, the above implication may be replaced with the
assumption that poor people have conformism for the consumption behavior of rich
people, but there is no other way around.
Second, even if the intragroup consumption externalities do not exist (i.e., ϕi = 0





o < 0 is satisﬁed.2
2In numerical examples of Section 4, we show that the indeterminacy arises when the intergroup
12Proposition 2 means that the necessary condition under which the steady state





We ﬁnd that a set of suﬃcient conditions for holding determinacy is the following:






















o), then the unique steady state has the saddle-path stability.
Proof. Let us denote roots of the characteristic equation by λs (s = 1,2,3,4). As
(20) shows, the sign of the trace of J, which equals
∑4
s=1 λs, is strictly positive.
Hence, at least one of the characteristic roots has positive real part. The assumption
(i) holds that the determinant has a positive sign, which implies that the determinant
J (= Π4
s=1λs) is strictly positive: see (23). This means that the number of charac-
teristic roots with positive real parts is either two or four. The assumptions (ii) and
(iii) hold that ZJ, which equals λ1λ2λ3 + λ2λ4λ1 + λ3λ4λ1 + λ2λ3λ4, has a negative
sign, so that at least the number of stable root is above one. Consequently, there
are two characteristic roots with positive real part. This demonstrates that there is
a two–dimensional stable manifold around the steady state, implying that the com-
petitive equilibrium path converging to the steady state is uniquely determined. See
the detail proof in Appendix B. ■
Furthermore, we see that if there are no intergroup external eﬀects, then the
equilibrium path is determinate. The following result indicates that intergroup ex-
ternal eﬀects play a pivotal role to prevent the dynamic system of holding a regular
saddlepoint property:
Corollary 1. When Ω1
o = Ω2
o = 0, the unique steady state satises local determi-
nacy.
Proof. At ﬁrst, we note that the trace of J always has a positive sign. Assuming
that Ω1
o = Ω2
o = 0, the conditions (i)–(iii) in Proposition 3 are satisﬁed. Hence, the
consumption externalities exist but the intragroup ones do not exist in which the existence of
intragroup consumption externalities expands to the region of indeterminacy.
13steady state satisﬁes saddle-point stability. ■
To understand the results shown above more clearly, suppose that the utility












, i,j = 1,2, i ̸= j. (24)
Here, γi denotes the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution in felicity.
The parameter ϕi represents the extent of the intragroup consumption externalities,
whereas ηi shows the degree of inter-group externalities. From (24) we ﬁnd that Ωi
s
and Ωi
o are given by constant parameters as follows:
Ω
i
s = γi − ϕi(1 − γi)(> 0), (25a)
Ω
i
o = −ηi(1 − γi). (25b)










= {γ1 − ϕ1(1 − γ1)}{γ2 − ϕ2(1 − γ2)} − η1η2(1 − γ1)(1 − γ2). (26)
Corollary 1 says that when Ω1
o = Ω2
o = 0 (i.e., η1 = η2 = 0 in (24)), then the
economy has a unique converging path towards the unique steady-state equilibrium,
regardless of the diﬀerent preferences of each type of agents. Concerning (25a), this is
due to the positive sign of determinant from Ω1
sΩ2
s = {γ1 − ϕ1(1 − γ1)}{γ2 − ϕ2(1 − γ2)} >
0. Intuitively, assuming that households in a group have neither jealousy nor admi-
ration about the consumption level of the other group’s members, the diﬀerent rates
of time preference as well as the diﬀerent form of utility function do not aﬀect the
stability of the steady state so that the economy satisﬁes saddle-path stability and
the competitive equilibrium path is uniquely determined.
Next, suppose that Ω1
o ̸= 0 and Ω2
o ̸= 0. That is, we consider the intergroup
consumption externalities. In this case, we can show the following suﬃcient condition
to satisfy the saddlepoint stability.
First, suppose that there is no intragroup consumption externality so that Ω1
s and
Ω2
s are equal to the pure rates of risk aversion without the intragroup consumption
14externalities (i.e, Ωi
s = γi, i = 1,2). In this case, Proposition 3 shows that the unique
steady state is saddlepoint stable even if the intergroup consumption externalities
exist. For example, if Ωi
s = γi > Ωi









γi in both groups, the steady






always has a positive sign as
conﬁrmed in (18). It means that if individuals’ preferences exhibit unit-conformism
as to the other group’s consumption behaviors, the economy satisﬁes the saddlepoint
stability when the degree of intergroup anti-conformism is small enough or the degree
of risk aversion is large enough.
Second, suppose that there is intragroup consumption externality. Unlike the
above, Ωi
s = γi−ϕi(1−γi) (i = 1,2), meaning that Ωi
s is not equal to the rate of risk
aversion. Thus, we need to consider the rate of risk aversion including the degree of
intragroup consumption externalities. Because the conditions given by Proposition
3 are not changed, the steady state satisﬁes local determinacy if the value of Ωi
o is
small enough or Ωi
s is large enough; however, as conﬁrmed in numerical examples
later, the presence of intragroup consumption externalities yields a richer region of
indeterminacy.
The above proposition fails to specify when indeterminacy emerges. Since it
is hard to present the analytical conditions for local indeterminacy (the suﬃcient
conditions under which that the characteristic equation has three stable roots), we
inspect numerical examples in Section 4.
3.4 Intuition
As shown by Proposition 2, the key to determine dynamic behavior of our model




o. To obtain an intuitive implication why this sign
plays a pivotal role, it is useful to inspect the ﬁrst order conditions for consumers’
optimization. Letting qi be the shadow value of capital held by Group i’s households,
the ﬁrst-order condition for each type of household is given by
u
1
1 (c1,C1,C2) = q1,
u
2
1 (c2,C2,C1) = q2,
15where qi changes according to
˙ qi = qi [(1 − τ(yi) − y1τ
′(yi))r − ρi], i = 1,2.
Using the consistency conditions, ci = Ci (i = 1,2), the optimal consumption levels
























































Note that if the own eﬀects of a change in consumption on the marginal utility




o > 0. In this case a higher qi
depresses Ci. In addition, if the households are conformists with respect to the other
group’s consumption behavior, Ωi
o has a negative value, so that a rise in qj lowers





o has a negative sign. Namely, if households are highly sensitive to the
consumption level of the other group’s agents, a higher marginal value of capital may
increase the current consumption. Again when Ωo is positive, a higher qj also raises
Ci.
Now suppose that a sunspot shock hits the economy and the households in both
groups anticipate that the rate of return to capital will rise. This raises the their





o > 0 and conformism prevails, then rises in q1 and q2 depresses current
consumption demand of both types of households, so that capital accumulation of
the entire economy is accelerated. As a result, the aggregate capital increases and the
rate of return to capital decreases. This contradicts the initial anticipated rise in the
rate of return to capital and, hence, the households’ expectations are not self-fulﬁlled.





o < 0, the expected rises in q1 and q2 increase the current
consumption of both types of households. Thus, savings increase and the resulting
lower aggregate capital raises the rate of return, r. In this case, the initial expectations
are self-fulﬁlled, which means that there may exist multiple (a inﬁnite number) of
equilibrium paths.
Note that if the households do not concern with the other group’s consumption,
then Ωi






















Therefore, a higher qi always depresses Ci.As a result, sunspot driven expected rise
in the value of capital lowers consumption of both groups,which decreases the rate
of return to capital. Therefore, multiple equilibrium cannot exist.




o is a part of necessary
conditions for determinacy/indeterminacy. In fact, as Proposition 3 shows, a set of





o > 0. If Ω1
sΩ2
s−Ω1
oΩ < 0, the steady state could be unstable rather than holding
indeterminacy. Therefore, the intuitive discussion shown above is a not a precise
description of the stability conditions but a rough sketch of the dynamics.
4 Numerical Analysis





then the steady-state equilibrium is either locally indeterminate or unstable. For the
purpose of distinguishing the conditions for indeterminacy from these for instability,
this section conducts numerical experiments by specifying the utility, production and
tax functions.
At ﬁrst, we make use of the utility function in (24) whose Ωi
s and Ωi
o are constant
as conﬁrmed in (25a) and (25b). Next, note that Ωi
s > 0 in (25a) because the
marginal utility of private consumption is decreasing regardless of the intragroup











= γi − ηi(1 − γi) > 0, i = 1,2. (27a)





o = γi − (ϕi + ηi)(1 − γi) > 0, i = 1,2. (27b)
As for the production function, it is given by Cobb-Douglas one:
f(K) = AK
α, 0 < α < 1, A > 0, (28)
where K = θ1k1 + θ2kt.
The tax function is speciﬁed as
τ (yi) = y
ξ
i, (29)
where ξ ≥ 1 so that the assumption 1 is always satisﬁed.
Our object is to clarify the eﬀects of intergroup consumption externalities on the
stability in numerical examples. Hence, we make use of the magnitudes of parameters
as simply as possible. First, we assume that the rates of time preference are the
same in both groups (i.e., ρ1 = ρ2) so that the steady-state levels of capital stock
and consumption are the same within groups. That is, the steady-state equilibrium
given by numerical examples is symmetric. Second, we assume that the population
sizes in two groups are the same (i.e., θ1 = θ2). Third, we make use of the linear tax
function not to consider the curvature of tax function (i.e., ξ = 1) so that the tax
function is speciﬁed as τ(yi) = yi.
The parameter set of our numerical examples is given by:
θ1 = θ2 = 0.5, A = 0.6, α = 0.25, ξ = 1, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.005.
To achieve the plausible rate of interest, we set that the rates of time preference are
0.005 and the production parameter A is 0.6. As a result, from (18) the steady-state
level of aggregate capital stock, K∗ = k∗
1 = k∗
2 is given by 0.45 so that the after-tax
rate of return, ˆ r in (6) is 0.14 and the before-tax rate of return, r is 0.27.
18As for the parameter values concerning the preference structure, we consider the
following three sets:3
(i) γ1 = γ2 = 0.2, ϕ1 = 0, η1 = −0.9,
(ii) γ1 = 5, γ2 = 0.2, ϕ1 = −0.9, η1 = −0.9,
(iii) γ1 = γ2 = 5, ϕ1 = −0.9, η1 = 0.9.
Let us conﬁrm the properties of respective cases. In case (i), we consider that the
intragroup consumption externalities in group 1 do not exist. That is, Ω1
s = γ1 = 0.2.
Alternatively, cases (ii) and (iii) suppose that the agents in group 1 have the high
degree of intragroup consumption externalities. This is because the positive value of
Ω1
s is as small as possible to conﬁrm the negative sign of determinant. That is, Ω1
s in
these cases (ii) and (iii) are given by 1.4. Because Ω1
s has a positive sign in all cases
(i)-(iii), the condition (25a) is satisﬁed.
Next, we take account of the agents’ preferences in group 1. In case (i), group
1’s agents do not have any interests about the consumption behavior of their own
group’s members (i.e., ϕi = 0), while they have jealousy and anti-conformism about
the average level of consumption in group 2. In case (ii), the agents in group 1
have jealousy and conformism about the consumption behavior of members in both
groups. In case (iii), group 1’s agents have jealousy and conformism for the average
level of consumption in the same group like in case (ii), but have admiration and
anti-conformism about the average level of consumption in group 2.
Given those parameter magnitudes, we change ϕ2 and η2 with appropriate inter-
vals. Figures 1, 2 and 3 respectively depict the case with preference parameters (i),
(ii) and (iii) displayed above. In these ﬁgures, we divide (ϕ2,η2) space according to
the stability conditions. For instance, the areas with a green cross show the com-
bination of ϕ2 and η2 that yields local determinacy, while those with a red triangle
show its combination that yields the unstability. The marker with a blue circle in-
dicates the steady-state equilibrium with the local indeterminacy. In addition, the
3As the pure values of risk aversion i approach to the unity, it would be diﬃcult to conﬁrm the
indeterminacy because the value of Ωi




o as conﬁrmed in Result 2.
19parameter sets with the black square do not satisfy the standard conditions of utility
functions in the sense that the marginal utility of private consumption is positive
and decreasing given by (2a) − (2c).
Let us look at Figure 1 which conﬁrms whether or not the indeterminacy could
arise even when the intragroup consumption externality in group 1 does not exist.
From the ﬁgure, we can see that the blue circles exist in the regions that ϕ2 = 0 and
η2 is around between -0.2 and -0.4. It means that even if the intragroup consumption
externalities in both groups do not exist, the indeterminacy arises. Next, when seeing
that ϕ2 has a positive sign as well as a negative sign in the region of blue circle, we can
show that whether agents in group 2 have conformism or anti-conformism does not
discharge the critical role for producing the indeterminacy. Alternatively, the sign of
η2 needs to be negative in the region of blue circle, meaning that the agents in group
2 are anti-conformist for the average level of consumption in group 1. Moreover,
taking account of the preferences of agents in group 1, the preferences of all agents
in both groups respectively indicate the anti-conformism for consumption behavior
of members in the other group in the area of blue circle.
While the pure rates of risk aversion, γ1 and γ2 in both groups are below the
unity in Figure 1, Figure 2 is the case that the pure rate of risk aversion in group 1
is above the unity and that in group 2 is below the unity. Hence, as seen in (25a)
and (25b), the preferences show the opposite characteristic if the signs of ϕ1 and ϕ2
(or η1 and η2) are the same. For example, when ϕ1 and ϕ2 have negative signs, the
agents in group 1 are conformist about the average level of consumption in group 1;
however, those in group 2 are anti-conformist about that in group 2. In this case,
ﬁgure 2 shows that all of blue circle are enclosed in black square. This means that the
number of stable roots is three, but the utility function in group 2 does not satisfy
the standard conditions that the marginal utility of private consumption is positive
and decreasing.
Finally, in Figure 3, we deal with the case that the pure rates of risk aversion
are above the unity in both groups. In this case, when the agents in both groups
are anti-conformist for the consumption behavior of members in the other group, the
20blue circle which shows indeterminacy is observed.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that if there are heterogenous agents and consumption external eﬀects
perceived by consumers are not uniform, then the equilibrium path of the standard
Ramsey economy may not display a regular saddle point property. The equilibrium
dynamics could be unstable or indeterminate if the intergroup consumption exter-
nalities have distinctive eﬀects on the consumers’ behaviors. In numerical examples,
we suppose the symmetric groups in the sense that the population size and the rates
of time preference are the same in both groups. In this time, even if the intragroup
consumption externalities do not exist, we conﬁrm that the intergroup consumption
externalities may produce the indeterminacy.
We are going to extend this model in two points. First, in this manuscript
we make use of the CRRA types of utility function whose elasticities are given by
constant parameters. Instead, for instance, when making use of the stone-geary








1−γi where ¯ ci is a
parameter shown by a subsistence level of consumption, these elasticities depend
on the level of private consumption as well as the preference parameters. In this
case, it would be useful to observe a change in the region of indeterminacy related
with the subsistence level. Second, in this paper we have employed a simple Ramsey
model with ﬁxed labor supply and a constant returns to scale technology. It would
be interesting to reconsider our discussion in models with increasing returns and/or
endogenous labor supply.
Appendix
Through the appendices, we make use of ∆(yi) ≡ τ(yi) + yiτ′(yi)(> 0) (i = 1,2).
From (18) and Assumption 1, we can show that
1 − ∆(y
∗













′′(K)θj(ki − K), i,j = 1,2, i ̸= j.
Concerning these signs, for instance, if ρ1 ≥ ρ2 so that k∗
2 ≥ K∗ ≥ k∗










We show that the steady state is uniquely determined under assumption 1 and
furthermore the steady-state level of capital stock with patient group is greater than
that with impatient group. For simplicity, we assume that the rate of time preference
in group 1 is more than that in group 2, ρ1 ≥ ρ2 so that households in group 1 are
impatient and those in group 2 are patient.




























f′(K∗)2 {−θ2f′′(K∗)(1 − ∆(y∗
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Note that the sign of brace is positive.
Concerning the denominator in (A.3),
∂y1
∂k1 (= f′(K) + f′′(K)θ1(k1 − K)) has a
positive sign because the assumption ρ1 ≥ ρ2 causes k∗
2 ≥ K∗ ≥ k∗
1. Therefore, the
sign of denominator is negative.
Because the sign of Γ′(k∗
2) is negative, we can from (A.2) conﬁrm that there
exists the unique level of group 2’s capital stock in the steady state, which uniquely
determines the steady-state level of capital stock in group 1.
22Let us relate the steady-state levels of capital stock in both groups and time














ρ1 ≥ ρ2, we can see that ∆(y∗
2) ≥ ∆(y∗
1). Taking account of the assumption 1, we
obtain that y∗
2 ≥ y∗

























































































































































































23Thus, the detail expression of the term ZJ in (22) is




























































o = 0, ZJ in (22) can be rewritten as




































Result 3: the case that 1 = 2:
When 1 = 2, we notice that y ≡ y∗
1 = y∗





























Note that ∆(y∗) = 1 −
ρ

















o), the sign of ZJ in (B:3) is negative.




o makes the sign of determinant negative, we can
conﬁrm the saddlepoint stability.
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Figure 1: The case 1 that ϕ1 = 0 and η1 = −0.9

































Figure 2: The case 2 that ϕ1 = 0 and η1 = 0.9

































Figure 3: The case 2 that ϕ1 = 0 and η1 = 0.9
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